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In recent years, African leaders have aggressively sought to strengthen their
regional security structures while simultaneously attempting to democratise.
Although they recognise that African regional organisations will need to
assume a greater role in tackling Africa's security problems, the challenges
posed by on-going democratisation efforts have had a visible impact on the
effectiveness of some regional organisations. This article examines the
challenges that democratisation poses to regional collective security
arrangements in Africa, with specific reference to ECOWAS and SADC.
It argues that whilst the inclination to democratise has influenced the
establishment of new collective security structures, the superficial nature of the
changes have prevented the gains at the structural level to be translated to
meaningful practice on the ground. Nevertheless, some progress has been
made.
African states have been compelled to democratise in the post-Cold War
environment, where transparency and accountability have gained pre-eminence
over historic state sovereignty ideology. At the same time, conflicts that were
suppressed by the Cold War system have found free expression. Thus, one main
challenge confronting African leaders is the need to re-examine regional security
structures in response to the increased incidence of intrastate conflict. The search
for effective regional and sub-regional arrangements that may ensure peace and
security on the continent has coincided with external demands for Africa to
democratise.
Africa's most prominent organisation, the Organisation of African Unity
(OAU), and sub-regional actors such as the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC)
have and are taking steps to establish the necessary mechanisms to respond
effectively to both intrastate and interstate conflict. In 1993, the OAU created the
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (OAU

































REGIONAL SECURITY AND THE CHALLENGES OF DEMOCRATISATION
Mechanism). Likewise, the ECOWAS Revised Treaty of 1993 made provision for the
establishment of a regional collective security mechanism, and in 1998 it
established a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution,
Peacekeeping and Security (ECOWAS Mechanism). Similarly, in 1996, SADC
instituted an Organ for Politics, Defence and Security (Organ), and in 1997
supplemented it with a Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security (Protocol). Such
organisations face serious political and economic challenges, as their member
states struggle to develop and democratise amidst harsh domestic circumstances,
and under the scrutiny of coercive financial institutions and donor governments.
Clearly, the obligations of democratisation have affected the ability of African
regional actors to maintain peace and security. This article examines how the
challenges of democratisation have and will influence the structure and works of
ECOWAS and SADC.
Regional security in the ColdWarera
TheOAU
During the Cold War, states were concerned primarily with interstate as
opposed to intrastate security issues. The domestic affairs of states were arguably
of secondary importance in the international system, where political and
economic ideology and alignment took precedence over the need to construct
viable and accountable regimes.
In Africa, as in other regions, security was seen largely within the context of
interstate relations. The need for states to maintain their territorial integrity and
political independence was at the core of regional security concerns in Africa. The
urge by some states to redraw the artificial boundaries inherited from their
colonial masters coupled with ethnic claims for self-determination posed new
security dilemmas on the continent. Thus, the OAU's primary concern was
safeguarding of the international law principles of state sovereignty, territorial
integrity and non-intervention. The solidification of the inherited frontiers
resulted in perhaps one major benefit: it prevented several intrastate conflicts
from evolving into interstate catastrophes.
The founding members of the OAU adopted a long-term geopolitical strategy
that guaranteed the political independence of their states but inhibited authentic
democratisation. The majority of the newly appointed African Heads of State and
Government appeared to be preoccupied with serving the metropolis of their
former colonial masters (e.g., Omar Bongo in Gabon), or increasing their personal
wealth and that of foreign banking institutions (e.g., Sese Mobutu in former Zaire).
Hence, Kwame Nkrumah's proposals for a United States of Africa and African High
Command received only modest support.1 OAU leaders were reluctant to cede
their sovereignty to a supranational government, having only just emerged from
colonial domination. In this sense, the OAU Charter reflected the political
sensitivity of its member states.
During the Cold War, individual human security was overshadowed by African
preoccupations with state security. Human security was regarded as a purely

































internal issue, as the principle of non-interference took precedence in the
formulation of security policy in Africa and the West. The net result was that many
African leaders could not be held accountable for repressing and exploiting their
populations. Furthermore, since the majority of African regimes were
authoritarian, it was highly unlikely that such regimes would seek to enforce the
rule of law on others.
In the immediate post-independence era, several African regimes maintained
a tight grip over their internal security/affairs to shield themselves from the
revolutionary fervour that was sweeping the continent. Many leaders preferred
authoritarian patterns of governance to democratic ones, usually in the form of
one-party states, and their repressive policies received limited attention from the
international community, which was preoccupied with the politics of the Cold
War. Therefore, in Angola, Mozambique, Liberia, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Zaire
(now The Democratic Republic of the Congo, DRC) and others, authoritarian
regimes thrived at the expense of their civilian populations. It was common place
for authoritarian regimes to violently suppress internal opposition and ignore
demands for democratisation. On the eve of the end of the ColdWar, forty-two out
of forty-seven regimes in sub-Saharan Africa were non-democratic.2
The OAU Charter did not provide for adequate measures to deal with internal
conflict scenarios, which in most cases were a by-product of the repressive
policies of OAU leaders. As members of the highest decision-making body in the
OAU - the Authorityof Heads of States and Governments - member states were
secure in knowing that there were no institutional checks on their power. Six of the
seven fundamental principles enumerated in Article III of the OAU Charter ensure
the sovereignty of its member states, and in principle, prevent them from
interfering in the internal affairs of other members. This reality was reinforced by
the Cold War system, which as previously mentioned, was more concerned with
ideological positioning than the internal affairs of other states. The end result was
the absence of viable security mechanisms to avert state collapse and anarchy.
The OAU's commitment to guaranteeing states rights rather than human rights
limited its peacemaking role in situations where internal disputes had escalated
into armed conflict, resulting in untold loss of life and state insecurity, as
witnessed in Chad and Sudan. This was particularly evident in the fact that the
OAU Charter made no provision for peacekeeping. The complex United Nations
Operation in the Congo (ONUC) appears to have made many African leaders wary
of the concept. Consequently, in 1981, the OAU failed miserably to take decisive
action during the Chadian conflict, until it became internationalised when Libya
sought to influence its outcome. The reluctance of the OAU to become involved in
internal conflicts was also apparent in Angola and Mozambique. Indeed, the
OAU's blind support for the recognised governments of both states hampered its
ability to respond effectively and impartially to warring in both countries.
ECOWAS and SADC
ECOWAS was primarily established to promote sub-regional economic
integration and development.3 Sub-regional security issues were of secondary

































REGIONAL SECURITY AND THE CHALLENGES OF DEMOCRATISATION
importance. Shortly after it was formed, ECOWAS determined that it could not
fulfil its developmental objectives amidst intrastate and interstate instability and
insecurity. For example, mercenaries invaded Benin in 1977, and Ghana suffered
a major coup d' etat in 1981. These events, amongst others, appear to have
influenced ECOWAS to establish a collective security framework. As a result, it
adopted a Protocol on Non-Aggression in 1978, which affirmed that it could not
'attain its objectives save in an atmosphere of peace and harmonious
understanding among member states of the community'.4 Furthermore, the
Protocol states that:
Members States shall, in their relations with one another, refrain from the
threat or use of force or aggression, or from employing any other means
inconsistent with the Charters of the United Nations and the Organisation of
African Unity against the territorial integrity or political independence of
other Member-States.5
Likewise, in 1981 it adopted the Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance in
Defence, which concluded that 'any armed threat or aggression directed against
any member state shall constitute a threat or aggression against the Community'.6
ECOWAS intended for the Protocols to promote peace and security in the sub-
region, so that the processes of democratisation could continue unabated. Yet, it
did not establish a mechanism to deal with purely internal conflicts as opposed to
those that were externally engineered. Akin to the case of the OAU, the political
will did not exist to empower states to intervene in the internal affairs of states.
Consequently, despotism, cronyism, clientelism and corruption caused weak
states to collapse and slide into anarchy, forestalling and prolonging genuine
democratisation.
Moreover, colonially inspired anglophone-francophone tensions inhibited
sub-regional cooperation.7 For example, France provoked geo-linguistic sub-
regional divisions by impelling Burkina Faso, Cdte d'lvoire, Mali, Mauritania,
Niger, Senegal and Togo to enter into an agreement on Non-Aggression and
Assistance in Defence (ANAD) in 1977, to rival ECOWAS. Until recently, no
attempts had been made to harmonise the strategic objectives of both
organisations. During the Cold War, domestic and sub-regional security concerns
as well as externally induced geopolitical rivalry appears to have inhibited
ECOWAS' ability to develop a sound collective security framework, that in turn
affected the speed at which most West African regimes sought to democratise.
These circumstances had a negative impact on the structural composition of
African regimes, as African leaders employed the machinery of the state to
preserve their hold on power. This may in part explain why many more
authoritarian governments arose than democratic ones.
In Southern Africa, the need to contain the military threat from South Africa
lay at the heart of security considerations. Unlike the West African sub-region,
Southern Africa was more concerned with the military aspects of security. Sub-
regional security cooperation began with the establishment of the Front line

































States (FLS) in 1974. The FLS initially included Tanzania and Zambia, but later
expanded to include Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Namibia and Zimbabwe.
The main body responsible for implementing FLS policies was the Inter-State
Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC).8 Democratisation was secondary to the
attainment of Black rule in the sub-region, which would not have been possible
had the white settler oligarchic regimes in Rhodesia and South Africa continued to
broaden their sphere of influence. Hence, the FLS sought to ensure that this would
not happen. For example, the mutual defence objectives of the FLS prevented
South Africa from maintaining a comfortable foothold in Namibia.
The notion of economic, non-military aspects of security came to the fore later
with the advent of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference
(SADCC) in 1979. SADCC sought to achieve greater economic cooperation in
order to reduce its dependence on South Africa. In 1992, SADCC was transformed
into the Southern African Development Community (SADC). SADC is primarily
concerned with promoting sub-regional political and economic integration and
security. With South Africa's transition to democracy in 1994, sub-regional
economic issues began to take precedence over security concerns, demonstrating
that political stability, i.e. democratisation, is a precondition for economic
development.
Post- Cold War restructuring
The end of the Cold War created new opportunities for African states to
restructure their security frameworks. However, it also presented new challenges,
as First World states devalued the geopolitical stock of African states. Bipolar
politics would no longer play a major role in African security arrangements, and
as a result, long standing conflicts could escalate freely in the absence of
superpower control. Since the ideological positioning of states was no longer a
prerequisite for politico-military and economic rewards, new conditionalities
emerged. Democratisation and good governance became preconditions for
economic aid. This, taken together with domestic pressures for change brought
about a major push for democratisation.
However, some states were not able to make democratic transitions as internal
conflicts matured into mass civil war resulting in state collapse, as was the case in
Liberia and Sierra Leone. Moreover, serious internal rebellion in Guinea-Bissau
and Niger, and political instability in Nigeria further prolonged democratisation.
In Southern Africa, some commentators speculated that with the end of the Cold
War, peace and stability would return to the region. Majority rule in South Africa
and peace in Namibia, Mozambique and Angola (albeit temporary) contributed to
this optimism. However, such sentiments were short-lived as warfare in Angola
persisted, political discontent in Lesotho erupted, political unrest in Zimbabwe
ripened, and the war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo engulfed the sub-
region. Hence, in the post-Cold War era, West and Southern African regimes have
struggled to develop structures that can foster peace and security and promote
democratisation and sustainable development.

































REGIONAL SECURITY AND THE CHALLENGES OF DEMOCRATISATION
Implications/or Regional Security Arrangements
Within and outside Africa, new concepts are being proposed and old ones
revised to adjust to the post-Cold War strategic environment. The concept of
common security, which emerged in the 1980s, has attracted greater attention in
recent years. Supporters of this concept argue that arms build-up will only result
in a security dilemma whereby a state's arms build-up forces its neighbour to do
the same; a seemingly endless cycle that eventually leads to conflict.9 Thus, they
claim that states would benefit from reciprocal restraint and Confidence Building
Measures (CBM), where states pursue Non-Offensive Defence (NOD) in order to
achieve a policy of common security. However, the notion of common security
transcends the military realm to include economic, social and environmental
aspects of security. The broadening of the security concept to include non-
military factors has gained ground in the post-Cold War era. Consequently, a
collective security regime is emerging 'where the principles of common security
have been adopted by all relevant states within a certain international system or
subsystem',10 in this respect, ECOWAS and SADC.
For some time, security analysts have attempted to expand the concept of
security from its previously narrow militaristic focus to include non-military
dimensions.11 Today, it is apparent that political, economic and military insecurity
in Africa for the most part is a by-product of internal as opposed to external
phenomena. State collapse, economic stagnation, corruption, resource scarcity,
technological backwardness, overpopulation, ethnic rivalry, environmental
degradation, terrorism, crime and disease are all ailments caused by domestic
rather than international factors. Caroline Thomas suggests that state-centric
approaches to security only identify physical threats outside the territorial
boundaries of states, and views military build-up as the response to such
perceived challenges. She argues that debt, poverty, environmental and other
non-military dimensions should be included in the security calculus.12 Barry
Buzan suggests that, although the concept of security should be broadened to
include non-military dimensions, the state is the principal referent object of
security as it forms the framework of order and serves as the primary governing
authority.13
Yet, before the African state can fulfil its security function adequately,
democratic and accountable institutions must be established and maintained so
that African civil society may be confident that their basic human needs take
precedence over the wants of political elites. In this sense, democratisation is a
precondition for long-term internal security. Genuine democratisation cannot,
however, take place amidst internal or sub-regional insecurity. Hence, there is a
circular causation between collective security and democratisation, which African
regional organisations must take into account when formulating a new security
policy and creating conflict management mechanisms.
Alternative concepts of common security are being advanced because the
collective security system envisaged in the UN Charter for the most part has failed
to bring about international peace and security. This is particularly true with

































respect to Africa, which has been left to resolve its own conflicts, whether
interstate (e.g., the DRC) or intrastate (e.g., Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau
and Lesotho). The UN has failed dismally to proffer adequate solutions to the
latter type of conflict. The underlying premise of the western collective security
doctrine presupposes that the aggregated efforts of states will be directed against
an aggressor state or be used to remove threats to international peace and security.
This doctrine is for the most part a manifestation of western experiences in the
First World, not intrastate conflict in the Third. For example, the failure of the US-
led UN mission in Somalia in 1992 and the Belgium-led UN mission in Rwanda in
1994 are prime examples in this regard. The question remains what type of
collective security strategy does Africa need in order for democratic institutions to
emerge?
Although African states have begun to respond to the challenges of the new
security environment, serious challenges remain. At the very least, the new
security situation has demanded a collective recognition of the need for collective
security among states at both regional and sub-regional levels. For example, the
OAU has determined that it can no longer strictly adhere to the principle of non-
intervention when violent conflict, state collapse or anarchy engulf a state. This
was certainly the case when a coup d'etat was carried out against the
democratically elected government of Tejan Kabbah of Sierra Leone by military
junta and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). In response to these events, the
OAU Council of Ministers decided that it' [s] trongly and unequivocally condemns
the coup d etat [...] and calls for the immediate restoration of constitutional order
[and] appeals to the leaders of ECOWAS to assist the people of Sierra Leone to
restore constitutional order to the country [...]'14 It has also established the OAU
Mechanism in order to employ a systematic rather than ad hoc approach to
conflict resolution.15 However, the OAU is still plagued by many of the problems
that prevented it from being an effective conflict broker during the Cold War.
Generally speaking, it is difficult for the collective interests of states to
coincide on security issues at the regional level (sub-Saharan Africa as a whole)
and therefore difficult to obtain consensus, or a common political will to deal with
major security dilemmas effectively. In such an environment, a common security
agenda is difficult to agree on, let alone implement. However, at the sub-regional
level it has been less problematic to pursue such an agenda. For example, South
Africa did not have a problem in understanding the efficacy of military
intervention in Lesotho. However, it would have been politically taboo for it to
intervene in Guinea-Bissau. Invariably, only those states within sub-regions that
have common political, economic and military interests are likely to invest in sub-
regional security. Nevertheless, in sub-regional organisations where member-
states have sought to enforce a common security agenda, other challenges have
stood in the way of progress. For example, the move towards democratisation
among some states (e.g. South Africa), which served as a catalyst for progress in
the SADC organisation, has not achieved the same result in ECOWAS, albeit this
may change with the coming of a free Nigeria.

































REGIONAL SECURITY AND THE CHALLENGES OF DEMOCRATISATION
The impact ofdemocratisation on ECOWAS and SADC
With some exceptions, and to varying degrees, the member states of ECOWAS
and SADC have made successful democratic transitions. Democratisation has
brought greater international and regional legitimacy to the organisations and
their respective sub-regions. In the Southern region, democracy in South Africa
spawned the transformation of SADCC into SADC. In addition, the threat of sub-
regional interstate conflict was reduced greatly with a 'free' South Africa, and
SADC's politico-military and economic capacity was enhanced significantly.
Democratisation in Southern Africa influenced the objectives of SADC
considerably. The inclusion of a democratic South Africa in the new structure
coupled with a progressive political climate within a number of the member
states, brought about an unprecedented level of sub-regional cooperation. The
guiding principles of the organisation, namely that it achieve 'solidarity, peace and
security in the region' so that its member may observe 'human rights, democracy
and the rule of law',16 demonstrate a commitment to promote peace, security and
stability to allow for genuine democratisation and development. SADC's holistic
approach is very different from the original treaty of ECOWAS, for example, which
did not consider the rule of law or democracy seriously.
Furthermore, the establishment of the SADC Organ in June 1996 and the
adoption of the SADC Protocol nearly one year later further evidence the
organisation's dedication to democracy and sub-regional security. Amongst other
goals, the primary objectives of the Organ is to 'promote and enhance the
development of democratic institutions and practices within member states',
'encourage the observance of universal human rights, and co-operate fully in
regional security and defence through conflict prevention, management and
resolution'.17 In addition, it also seeks to 'develop a collective security capacity and
conclude a Mutual Defence Pact for responding to external threats', and 'promote
peace-making and peace-keeping in order to achieve sustainable peace and
security'.18 Likewise, the SADC Protocol was adopted to determine the type of
measures the Organ would employ if it needed to conduct peace enforcement
operations in a state. The Protocol empowers SADC to take forcible military
intervention in 'intra-state conflict' to forestall 'large-scale' warring to ensure
democracy by protecting the interests of a 'legitimate government'.19 The Protocol
also permits SADC to take such action in 'interstate conflict' to prevent 'cross-
border aggression or the threat of such aggression' or 'disagreement over
territorial boundaries'.20
Until November 1998, with the introduction of the new ECOWAS Mechanism,
the situation in the Southern region differed greatly from that of West Africa,
where the regional hegemon, Nigeria, had been under the rule of a ruthless and
corrupt autocrat. Hence, the ECOWAS Revised Treaty of 1993 and the ECOWAS
Mechanism appear to have been manifestations of the organisations sub-regional
experiences in Liberia and Sierra Leone as well as external influences from within
and outside of the continent rather than the hegemonic conceptions of Nigeria.
The absence of true democratisation in a number of ECOWAS member states,
particularly in the sub-regions most populous state, Nigeria, had a significant

































impact on the organisation's activities, most notably in the field of peacekeeping.
The ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) operation in Liberia was
novel in many respects. However, it would undoubtedly have been more
successful had it been under the direction of responsible and accountable sub-
regional leadership. Although there may have been several reasons why the
ECOMOG operation in Liberia encountered problems,21 foremost among them
was Nigeria's authoritarian leadership style. This may be attributed to the
autocratic character of the Nigerian state, given that it was under General Abacha's
rule for the latter five years of the operation.
Some of the failures of ECOWAS in Liberia (and to a lesser extent Sierra Leone)
clearly emanated from the management of the operation by non-democratic
regimes. Both operations were under the political direction of military leaders,
which was evident in their overtly offensive character.22 In the case of Liberia, for
example, the operation lacked legitimacy, impartiality and coherent political
direction because it did not include official and unofficial non-military agents on
the ground. Moreover, the unilateral decision-making style of Nigeria disrupted
the democratic-consensus building channels within ECOWAS. Yet, had Nigeria
originally employed a communal approach, it does not appear that such channels
would have been utilised, since nine of the sixteen member states of ECOWAS
were under military rule at the time of the intervention, and the majority of others
could be categorised as authoritarian regimes. In fact, some of the member states
of ECOWAS were determined to prevent civilian-led insurrections from unseating
military regimes in the sub-region.23 All but one of the members of the Standing
Mediation Committee, which initiated the ECOMOG operation and initially was
responsible for its management, were governed by authoritarian regimes.24
Today, ECOWAS is a more effective organisation than it was in the early and
mid-1990s because many states that were previously under authoritarian rule
have made democratic transitions (e.g. Nigeria, Guinea, Ghana and Mali), and
internal conflict has been replaced by democratisation in those states that were
formerly engulfed in war (e.g. Liberia and Sierra Leone). From a regional security
perspective, the ECOWAS missions in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau
have prevented the sub-region from descending into absolute chaos.
Nevertheless, ECOWAS may still be classified as an ineffective organisation, akin
to the OAU, due to its legacy of adopting popular and progressive liberal
democratic instruments of grand political, economic and social significance, but
not mustering the political will to implement them. This phenomenon may be
ascribed to the influences of bad leaders and corrupt regimes, the majority of
which, today, seem to reside in francophone African states.
However, the adoption of the ECOWAS Mechanism may signal a progressive
change in the attitudes of ECOWAS leaders as it is by far the most advanced and
authentically African regional collective security mechanism on the continent. It
is clear that the Mechanism was introduced as a result of the sub-regional
experiences of ECOWAS-ECOMOG in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and that due
consideration and respect were given to the rule of law and democracy. For
example, Article 46 of the Protocol, which deals with 'internal situations', i.e.

































REGIONAL SECURITY AND THE CHALLENGES OF DEMOCRATISATION
purely internal conflicts, indicates that ECOWAS may intervene forcibly in states
when a situation poses 'a serious threat to peace in the sub-region' or erupts
following the 'overthrow or attempted overthrow of a democratically elected
government.15 Hence, with a free Nigeria to lead the sub-region, the ECOWAS
would appear to be in a viable position to foster security, stability and
development, objectives it has longed to meet for nearly twenty-five years.
The ghost of autocracy and dilemmas for sub-regional hegemonies
With few exceptions, progress towards democratisation has been largely
cosmetic in those countries that have experienced multiparty elections.26
Intimidation of opposition groups and the press, and continued violations of
human rights ensure that old tensions remain. In the West African sub-region,
Ghana and Mali appear to have made the greatest moves towards
democratisation, yet in both states, problems persist. In Niger, democratisation
efforts were forestalled when President Mainassara was assassinated by members
of his presidential guard, resulting in the restoration of military rule. Likewise, in
the Southern African region, Presidents Mugabe and Nujoma of Zimbabwe and
Namibia respectively would appear poised to stay in power indefinitely. In Angola,
warring has continued despite elections.
Superficially, the domestic political situations in these countries would not
appear to have an effect on ECOWAS and SADC. Yet, the implications are
significant, and the challenges for both organisations are considerable. As
previously mentioned, the failure of Nigeria to democratise had a clear impact on
the works of the organisation. Paradoxically, had Nigeria been under a civilian
democratic government, it is highly unlikely that ECOMOG would have remained
in Liberia for seven years and intervened in Sierra Leone in the way that it did, if
at all. Nevertheless, had a democratic regime been in power in Nigeria, other
African states as well as western donors may have offered the requisite political
and economic support to make both operations more effective, thus lessening the
burden on Nigeria. The ECOMOG mission in Guinea-Bissau serves as a good
example in this regard. Here France provided the necessary economic and
logistical assistance to make the operation successful.
The SADC experience has demonstrated how democratisation of the hegemon
is an important but not sufficient guarantee for security and development. This is
particularly the case when its hegemony is in dispute (e.g. Zimbabwe/South Africa
rivalry) and other states are unwilling to commit to the same level of
democratisation (e.g. Mozambique and Angola). If regional hegemony is not in
dispute, or as in the case of Nigeria, if effective challenge cannot be mounted,
such a hegemon may have a profound influence on the workings of the sub-
regional organisation. A responsible and accountable hegemon can have a
positive impact on other states within the sub-region and the organisation in
which it belongs.
SADC has had a different experience than ECOWAS. Majority rule and
democracy in South Africa allowed for the creation of the SADC Organ and
adoption of the SADC Protocol. Alternatively, the ECOWAS Mechanism was

































established prior to Nigeria's transition to democracy. Because the SADC
instruments were established in an era of peace and security, their genuineness
have not been questioned. The ECOWAS Mechanism, on the other hand, has not
attained a similar legitimacy because it was instituted at a time when the sub-
region had not yet shed the yokes of authoritarianism and conflict. Nevertheless,
SADC has encountered significant problems with respect to the Organ and
Protocol, as South Africa and Zimbabwe have allowed geopolitical rivalry to
interfere with the requirements of sub-regional and regional peace and security.
The conflict has manifested itself in the debate over the character of the Organ,
and has influenced negatively SADC's capacity to evolve a viable solution to the
conflict in the DRC.
Another problem of SADC was that, although many of the member states were
able to undertake successful democratic transitions, i.e., host majority elections,
very few embraced true democratic values. Thus, when Mandela's government
suggested that it should be empowered to enforce its own rules (e.g. human
rights), many states, which do not have responsible and transparent regimes,
opposed the initiative. Several member states have also resented what they
consider South African attempts to dominate the sub-region and influence their
internal affairs.27 Therefore, unless the member states of ECOWAS and SADC
begin to place the same emphasis on the interests of the sub-region as on their
own, both organisations will continue to struggle to implement their respective
objectives competently in the new millennium.
Conclusion
The above analysis suggests that, as African states democratise, the sub-
regional and regional mechanisms to they belong will attain greater legitimacy
and become more effective. Hence, it maybe said that there is a circular causation
between genuine democratisation and regional security. The two both processes
are interrelated and follow a similar logic; peace, security and sustainable
development cannot occur in states that have authoritarian regimes and do not
observe the rule of law. Authentic democratisation requires that democratic
institutions be instituted at every level of civil society, including local, national
and even sub-regional levels. Democratic capacity-building must take place in
rural as well as urban areas, and African civil society must have the freedom to
construct structures that promote human rights, democracy and security. Sub-
regional organisations such as ECOWAS and SADC have a legal, moral and
political obligation to ensure that regimes do not violate the rule of law at the
expense of their populations, so that the collective will of the citizens may find
democratic expression. Liberal democracy necessitates that, as a minimum,
governments ensure that the requisite amount of security exists to ensure this
expression.
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